Civil society and modernity

From beneficiaries to participants

The unquestionable reality of African civil society highlighted in a recent report by the United Nations Special Office for Africa

Edited by Scott G. Chaplowe


On this page we publish a report that was kindly forwarded by the United Nations Special Office for Africa and Less Developed Countries (OSCAL). The report highlights the enriching experiences provided by the dynamic civil society organisations in Africa and how these testify to the fact that modern societies are the result of growing social structures and their increased responsibility towards the whole of society. The report also draws a territorial map of these organisations and describes the sectors in which they are active. This demonstrates that it is impossible to draw generalised conclusions as regards civil society in Africa, which is actually a continuously developing reality, whose political and economic implications should be analysed in relation to each single context.




Preface

A march in Durban, South Africa during the 13th International AIDS Conference to demand a decrease in the cost of AIDS treatment. Source: Ketan Joshi, Photoshare

We know from experience that neither the United Nations nor individual states can, by themselves, meet the challenges of the 21st century. We know that civil society's participation is essential.

In recognition of this importance, the UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) established in 1994 an ad-hoc DESA Task Force of NGO Focal Points with the mission to acknowledge and understand the emerging role of NGOs and demonstrate how it is reflected in the work of DESA; identify how the DESA's various divisions monitor the growing involvement of NGOs in their work, and create a long-term strategy to nurture this emerging relationship to achieve the global goals entrusted to the Department.

In line with these global goals, the UN Office of the Special Coordinator for Africa and the Least Developed Countries (UN/OSCAL) has supported the participation of African civil society in the design, implementation and monitoring of programmes and initiatives on Africa since its inception in 1992. This Report, African Civil Society Organizations & Development: Re-Evaluating for the 21st Century, is part of this endeavour. It builds upon a series of reports from the UN/OSCAL (1996ab, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000) that highlight the vast, inherent potential within Africa for development. The complete Report brings together seventeen informative contributions discussing African civil society from organizations either of or supporting African civil society. (Each contribution is presented in the language in which it was prepared, except Partnership Africa Canada, Coalition of the Families in the Fight against AIDS, and UN-ECOSOC NGO Section, which were submitted in English and French). Drawing from these contributions and the vast literature on African civil society and development, this Summary Report serves as an introduction, presenting an overview of key issues regarding African civil society as it enters the new millennium.

1. Introduction

A volunteer helps local woman who make dyes for clothing, Zambia Source: UN Photo

Africa faces formidable challenges at the start of this 21st century (Belshaw & Livingstone, 2002). However, while acknowledging the seriousness of Africa's predicament, it is also important not to succumb to the Afro-pessimism that often permeates the development community (Gordon & Wolpe, 1998; Roe 1999). There are success stories in African development, some of which are contained in these pages. This Report builds upon a series of reports from the United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator for Africa and the Least Developed Countries (UN/OSCAL 1996ab, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000) that highlight the vast, inherent potential within Africa for development. Specifically, this Report focuses on African civil society, which has emerged as a key development player in recent decades. In December 1999, The Economist reported that NGOs delivered more aid than the whole United Nations system (cited in Hudock, 2000), and the World Bank (2001a) estimates that over US $5 billion in aid is channeled through NGOs annually. As the UN Under-Secretary General (1994), Department of Economic and Social Affairs, expresses:

What we are seeing today is not just a vast increase... of non-governmental organizations of various types and shapes... It is the emergence of a broader reality - now commonly referred to as ' civil society' - which is the sphere in which social movements organize themselves around objectives, constituencies and thematic interests and interact with the other spheres that make up societies, especially that of the State...this phenomenon is having a measurable impact in critical areas.

Two parallel trends have helped to propel civil society into the development spotlight. Foremost are global changes that shaped the context in which development actors operate. These changes include rapid economic liberalization and privatization, the retreat of the nation-state, and democratization and decentralization. Second, there has been a significant evolution in the concept and approach to development from economic growth to human well being - development "with a human face" (Cornia et al., 1987). In turn, the perception and treatment of people in less developed countries began to change from beneficiaries to participants, while the concept and practice of development evolved from charity to empowering, stressing freedom as the primary end and the principal means of development (Sen, 1999). As the UN Secretary-General (2000a) aptly expressed to the United Nations Millennium Assembly:

No shift in the way we think or act can be more critical than this: we must put people at the center of everything we do. No calling is more noble, and no responsibility greater, than that of enabling men and women and children, in cities and villages around the world, to make their lives better.

In the wake of these ongoing trends in development, international development donors and agencies have increasingly turned toward civil society organizations (CSOs) to replace retreating state services with their decentralized and participatory approaches to development. Now, as we enter the new millennium, African civil society has entered an era that calls for a new understanding of itself and its role in development. This Report is part of that endeavour. It brings together seventeen informative contributions discussing African civil society from organizations either of or supporting African civil society. The remainder of this Summary Report presents an overview of some of the key issues regarding African civil society, drawing upon the contributions to illustrate pertinent points. Much has already been written on the potential role of CSOs (Civil Society Organisations) in African development, and it would be safe to say that their role is often credited with abilities above and beyond their actual capacity. Thus, while the overall tone of this Report is upbeat, it also exercises a healthy caution. There are no magic elixirs for "underdevelopment", and the success of African civil society in development rests as much in recognizing its limitations and as it does in empowering its potential.

2. Revisiting African "Civil Society"

Civil society is a complex and contested concept with multiple interpretations and interventions (Ehrehburg, 1999). Like the term sustainable, civil society is a very malleable concept, easily co-opted to serve various interests. Most conventional definitions, however, identify it as a third sector in a tripartite relationship with the state and market: "…civil society is, together with state and market, one of the three "spheres" that interface in the making of democratic societies. Civil society is the sphere in which social movements become organized," (UNDP, 1993). Another important characteristic associated with civil society is that it is an arena where citizens collectively exercise civic values to promote community well-being while not threatening the rights of others (Naidoo and Tandon, 1999). Therefore, questions of cultural values, tolerance for diversity, gender relations, and values of self-expression are critical considerations for conceptualizing civil society. As Edwards and Sen (2000) point out, social advancement is unsustainable if strategies to improve material well-being are not accompanied by shifts in "inner values" that ensure that improvements for some do not come at the cost for others. Several of the contributions in this Report illustrate how civil society organizations (CSOs) foster "inner shifts" in how people perceive and relate to themselves and others (Box 1).

While useful, there are important limitations to the conventional definitions of civil society (Kasfir, 1998ab; Orvis, 2001). The primary critique is they are too narrow, excluding critical realities within African civil society. Critics warn that civil society is an imported concept from a Western democratic tradition clearly distinct from Africa. Restricting the definition to Western, civic norms, "impoverishes the concept's capacity to explain social change and even the reforms it promotes," (Kasfir, 1998a). This is especially true of ethnic or patronage organizations in Africa. As a result, when Western donors support, or create, what they identify as legitimate civil society organizations (CSOs), these CSOs are often relatively young with shallow roots in the local culture; consequently, the development initiatives lack social sustainability. Thus, critics assert that normative approaches to civil society straightjacket the concept's ability, and those who wield it, to identify and address critical political and economic realities. Clearly, it is important to acknowledge this polemic: how one defines civil society largely determines priorities and approaches for working with it. However, it is far beyond the scope of this overview to determine how much society to include in the concept of civil society. Instead, we restrict discussion primarily to CSOs operating in African development, acknowledging their limitations, and identifying their success. Working from this perspective, it is essential to remember that CSOs do not equate with civil society as a whole, nor are they separate from the distinctly local political and economic power cleavages that are found in societies throughout the world.

3. Topology of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

The assortment of CSOs participating in African development is as broad and multidimensional as the development mission itself (UN-OSCAL/DESA, 1999). These organizations represent diverse and sometimes contradictory interests, according to their social base, constituency, and thematic orientations, the latter ranging from gender and human rights to environmental protection and humanitarian relief. It is important to remember that development CSOs do not represent the whole of organized civil society. For example, a religious group may or may not have a development orientation (Anhelm, 1999). The commonality between all development CSOs is that they represent and work on behalf of civic interests pertaining to development. Examples of development CSOs (and their array of acronyms) include membership organizations (MOs), non-profit organizations, voluntary organizations (VOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), farmers associations, labor unions, women's groups, microfinance organizations (MFIs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs). CSOs are also broadly divided according to the scale and scope of their operations. International CSOs, (such as Trickle Up and Eurostep in this Report), are commonly called northern NGOs (NNGOs) as they are mostly based in the developed countries of the north. National CSOs, (such as COWAN-Country Women's Association of Nigeria or NMJD-Network Movement for Justice and Development in this Report), are sometimes called southern NGOs (SNGOs) and serve whole countries or regions. Local CSOs, (such as GICPAB-Group of Common Initiative of the Women Farmers of Bogso in this Report), include grassroots organizations (GROs) and community based organizations (CBOs).

4. The Expansion of African CSOs

The number of development CSOs and resources channeled through them in Africa has mushroomed in the past two decades (Hudock, 2000; UN/OSCAL, 1996a, Wallace 2002). For example, in the 2001 fiscal year, civil society involvement in Bank projects in Africa accounted for more than one half the projects (World Bank, 2001b). Whereas expectations were initially high for the state in post-colonial Africa, this was soon replaced by skepticism as the expansion of the state brought with it an array of inefficiencies, including convoluted state bureaucracies, corruption, and urban bias in a largely rural continent (Mbaku, 1994; Odubogun, 1994). During the 1980s, multi- and bilateral donor agencies began to reassess the state as a vehicle for development and redirect funds to the private sector. Foremost among these efforts were the structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While structural adjustments and their merits are the target of much debate (Sahn et al., 1997; Simon et al., 1995), they nevertheless forced African states to reduce their level of expenditure and to withdraw from many market and development interventions. In turn, donor governments and multilateral agencies have embraced CSOs to "fill the gaps" created by retreating state services. CSOs are perceived to have a comparative advantage over the bureaucracy and inefficiency that often characterize state agencies, as well as the technocratic paradigms and practices that typify many large, international development organizations. Ideally, CSOs are more flexible, participatory, and responsive to the local needs of the poor - goals underscored by the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development in 1990 (UN/ECA, 1990).

Another impetus for the favored status of CSO in African development is their democratic appeal by redistributing power from the state to the citizens. These and other attributes associated with CSOs are discussed below.

5. Not Just Service Providers! - The Potential of CSOs

Kenyan research team belonging to a small grassroots organization, studying the erosion of African culture in Western Tanzania Source: Njamburi/Cabak ELS, Photoshare

CSOs have made a valuable contribution to African development, with fundamental, sustained improvements in people's well-being (Krishna et al., 1997; UN/OSCAL, 1997a, 1998, 2000; UN OSCAL/DESA, 1999). However, there is increasing concern that the role of many CSOs is confined to service providing, serving the agenda of more powerful development actors which CSOs depend upon for funding. In many cases, CSOs' reliance on donor-funded service delivery has come at the expense of more innovative (and sustainable) work to change policies and practices of local and state authorities, as well as international development agencies (Edwards and Hulme, 1996b; Manji, 2000; Mitlin, 2001). Are CSOs merely "ladles" in the "global soup kitchen", serving the less fortunate without any voice in the menu (Fowler, 1994, Malhotra, 2000)? Certainly CSOs do provide services, and donor influence is a major constrain on CSO autonomy and accountability, (which is discussed later). Nevertheless, as the examples in this Report attest, CSOs have a potential far greater than mere service providers (Box 2). In fact, it is this potential that initially drew the attention of the development community to CSOs as an alternative to the shortcomings of conventional development.

The following discussion outlines four styles, or potentials, that characterize CSO involvement in development: opportunism, humanitarian, capacity building, and advocacy. These CSO styles range (and are presented below) from those that acquiesce to those that challenge other development actors, whether it be the state or an international organization. Far from conclusive, these summaries are not a blueprint of CSO activity, and many CSOs share qualities from more than one category. For example, FAS (Box 2) and the Network Movement for Justice and Development (Box 3) are both active in capacity building as well as advocacy.

5.1. Opportunism

Opportunist CSOs accept donor or state money and projects without any of the deep concern for sociopolitical change that characterizes more progressive CSOs (Bebbington and Thiele, 1993; Edwards and Hulme, 1996a). These "mercenary" CSOs (Malena, 2000) are market-driven and design their products and services for the development purposes of donors or governments. As the availability of development funding for CSOs has increased over recent years, so has the proliferation of opportunist CSOs. This Report does not highlight these CSOs.

5.2. Humanitarian

Although this Report highlights capacity building and advocacy CSOs (below), humanitarian CSOs are another important category of CSOs. These CSOs provide swift and effective services in response to a crisis to save lives. They are often NGOs, such as the African Refugees Foundation or the African Service Committee, working closely with the state and international organizations to respond to wars, natural disasters, or failings of government provision. Their services may not be considered as much development as relief, but they are nevertheless critical, and ideally pursued with integrity and downward accountability to the recipients. Typically, the immediate urgency of their mission prevents these CSOs from focusing on capacity building, although these CSOs may also be very proactive in advocacy that compliments their fieldwork.

5.3. Capacity building

Capacity building provides material and technical support to communities, or other CSOs, as a means of strengthening and empowering their capacity to develop themselves. Capacity building is critical among CSOs ranging in size and scope from grassroots organizations to international NGOs. It allows CSOs to use and regenerate local resources and knowledge, and enhance local capacity to identify and solve problems. This, in turn fosters greater self-reliance and the capacity of local communities to effectively plan and implement other social projects. It can also encourage more equitable distribution of benefits as project management is accountable to a more representative community, and it typically allows greater input from women in the decision making process. In addition to Boxes 2 & 3, several contributions in this Report highlight other key areas that CSOs are actively building the capacity of Africans to develop:

· Food Security. In certain parts of Africa, food is not only a basic need, but a scarcity. According to International Fund for Agricultural development (IFAD), 21 of the 37 least food secure countries are in sub-Saharan Africa (Jazairy et. al., 1992). The Group of Common Initiative of the Women Farmers of Bogso (GICPAB) exemplifies a capacity building CSO at the community level. Located in the rural village of Bogso, Cameroon, GICPAB is a community based organization that has empowered local women in collective food security. Initial GICPAB efforts focused on the production of nutritional cassava for local consumption and market sales, but success in the programme has scaled-up into other areas, such as education and health care.

· Microfinance & Microenterprise. Africans are an incredibly enterprising people, especially in the informal economic sector, in which the majority of low-income people participate. This sector makes an invaluable contribution to economic and social development in Africa, accounting for over 20% of Africa's GDP, and providing up to 70% of new job openings in the 1990s (UN/OSCAL, 1996b). But as PRIDE AFRICA's contribution reminds us, "the informal sector is harassed, ignored, and excluded from the government development and private sector agenda." CSO organizations have played a key role in providing micro- credit and loan services to low-income people who would otherwise be marginalized from formal financial services (UN/OSCAL, 2000). In this Report, contributions from PRIDE AFRICA, Trickle Up, and COWAN (Country Women's Association of Nigeria) show innovative strategies that harness the entrepreneurial potential of Africans to better their lives.

· HIV/AIDS & Health Care. Despite global advancements in health care during the past three decades, nearly 50% of the people in sub-Saharan Africa lack access to health care (UNDP, 1997). The implications of inadequate health care is sadly expressed in Africa's HIV/AIDS crisis: with the lowest life expectancy of any region in the world, age 49, an estimated 70% of the world's HIV/AIDS victims are African (UNDP, 2001). This has had a devastating toll on the people, especially women, children, and the elderly. The contribution from WA MATA points out that the alarming rise in AIDS orphans has challenged not only these children, but those caring for them, especially grandmothers. As the contribution from Burkina Faso reports, an estimated 10% of the population is HIV infected. In response, the CSO, Coalition of the Families in the Fight against AIDS and Poverty (COFAL/SP), seeks to help families struggling with AIDS in Burkina Faso. COFAL/SP has a variety of interventions, including prevention, education, counseling, and the distribution of free condoms; nutritional support, as malnutrition is a primary cause of AIDS-related deaths; and support for HIV/AID children.

· Empowering Marginalized Peoples. As the contribution from WA MATA points out, although African women play a critical role in development, they face a bewildering array of social, economic and cultural discrimination that limit their access to economic resources and political participation. The UNDP (2001) reports that the 28 lowest ranking countries in both the Gender Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) are African. Like women, children in Africa are also disproportionately vulnerable to poverty and conflict. The Mutoko Orphanage, for instance, is a CSO created in 1994 to specifically target and assist some of the estimated 900,000 AIDS orphans in Zimbabwe. The contribution in this Report from Association Presse Jeune highlights innovative strategies to empower youth in Cameroon society through involvement in national affairs. In addition to FAS (Box 2), contributions from COWAN, GIC PAB, Trickle Up, and NMJD highlight innovative ways that CSOs are empowering women in microfinance and microenterprise, food security, human rights, and political advocacy and leadership. Trickle Up, for instance, seeks to foster healthy partnerships between husband and wife teams, as improving gender begins at the household level. COWAN encourages female, political aspirants to save regularly into a Women Political Participation Development Fund, which allows women to better participate in the political electoral process.

· Poverty Eradication. African poverty is a multifaceted problem, and any one of the above categories, as well as other development objectives (including environmental protection), is connected to poverty eradication (UNDP, 1997). The contribution from the Nigerian NGO, COWAN, illustrates the multi-dimensional nature of poverty eradication in its tripod approach, which includes economic, political, and social components to empower rural and urban women. The African Traditional Banking (ATRB) is COWAN's successful microfinance programme, which stresses savings and group solidarity to generate wealth and self-reliance. Social initiatives focus on health care, and COWAN members are required to invest a small portion of their profits towards health services, and arranges for a doctor and nurse to visit the community monthly to provide medical services, present talks, and counsel members on how to live a healthy and hygienic life.

5.4. Advocacy

In addition to innovative service delivery and capacity building, CSOs play an important role as advocates. Most of the problems that CSO confront have political and economic roots that extend far beyond the impacted communities they try to assist. Advocacy includes organizing social campaigns to defend the environment and interests of those otherwise marginalized, serving as a watchdog over the regulation of business practices, and lobbying governments for policy change and legal reform. A prominent African example of environmental and social advocacy is that of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People in the 1990s against the Nigerian government and the Shell corporation (Obi, 1997). Advocacy is, largely, a form of capacity building, strengthening the capacity to make legitimate demands of the states and international organizations that shape development (Edwards and Hulme, 1992; Malhotra, 2000). At the community level, CSOs are especially effective at advocacy because they typically work closer with communities and their problems than more remote development actors in government capitals or foreign cities. This builds the necessary trust for collective action, and advocating for changes meaningful to poor. This relationship is reinforced by the participatory and transparent strategies often employed by CSOs. Education plays an especially important role in advocacy, as collective support and action from people entails a mutual understanding of the causes of their problems. There is a need to "conscientise" people as an initial step in the process of identifying and ultimately challenging social, political, and economic structures that oppress them (Freire, 1970). In this Report, advocacy is highlighted by the contributions from FAS (Box 2) and COWAN, providing political voice to women; Eurostep and CEPARRED (Pan African Studies Research Center in International Relations and Education for Development), advocating for international economic rights and equality; and NMJD (Network Movement for Justice and Development) and Partnership Africa Canada, advocating for conflict resolution (Box 3).

6. Confronting Globalization and the Technological Revolution

Globalization, the international trend to liberalize and promote growth in national and global markets (UNCTAD, 1996), has raised much concern for African development (Deacon, 2000; Killick, 2001). The consequences have been devastating: in 18 Sub-Saharan countries the per capita incomes were lower in 1999 than in 1975 (UNDP, 1999). As the UNDP(1999) asserts:

Multilateral agreements have helped to establish global markets without considering their impacts on human development and poverty. The structures and processes for global policy-making are not representative …There is little transparency in decisions, and there is no structure forum for civil society institutions to express views.

This has not gone unnoticed by Africa's civil society, which has organized and voiced its concerns on several fronts. One recent example is its critical response to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)1. As the contribution from CEPARRED underscores, NEPAD fails to fundamentally address, "the essence and structure of global capitalism." This critique has been echoed by African civil society at large, as illustrated in January 2001 when participants from some 200 CSOs from 45 African countries met at the African Social Forum. The resultant Bamako Declaration stated: "The Forum rejected neo-liberal globalization and further integration of Africa into an unjust system as a basis for its growth and development," (Tandon 2002). Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, African CSOs have responded to globalization in countless other ways. Foremost are collaborative efforts, including intersectoral collaborations between CSOs and businesses, (which are discussed later).

Clients standing outside an NGO providing family planning and single mother services, Nairobi, Kenya Source: Mike Bailey, JHU/CCP, Photoshare

The globalization of the economy has been accompanied by an accelerating technological revolution, especially with information and communication technology (ICT). However, like globalization, the reality for African countries is increasing inequality, reflected by an accelerating "technological divide." In a continent that has less cellular phones than Thailand (UNDP, 2001), Africa's technological infrastructure is too underdeveloped to benefit from many of the technological advances and therefore compete with such trends elsewhere. As the UNDP (2001) warns, "although technology may be a tool for development, it is also a means of competitive advantage in the global economy." Nevertheless, there are significant examples of initiatives to address these problems. For example, the UN Informal Regional Network for NGOs (Box 4) prioritizes ICT access to African civil society. ICT can also play an important role in reinforcing partnerships among CSOs, as later discussed. Another notable example of applied technology is found in the SunLink programme described in the Pride Africa contribution. This programme utilizes technology, including tailored software, e-commerce, and magnetic stripe transaction cards, to provide better microfinance services to otherwise marginalized, informal sectors of the African economy.

7. CSOs & Democratization (A Heated Debate)

The relationship between CSOs and democratization has received much fanfare over the past two decades as the aid industry stressed democracy assistance, as well as decentralization, primarily through structural adjustment lending (Hearn, 2000; Van Rooy, 1999). Clearly, CSOs partake in many activities that are associated with democracy, including popular participation, social justice, gender equality, consciousness raising, human rights, transparency and accountability in decision making, and political education (Johnson, 2001; Blair, 1997). CSOs mobilize citizens to become politically active, and can break down customs of inequality and discrimination, instilling a democratic culture, (with "civic" values, as already discussed). Undoubtedly, these are principles that lay foundations for fair and equitable development (Sen, 1999; UNDP, 1997; World Bank, 2001a). However, they do not equate civil society with democracy, and CSOs are not always agents of democracy.

The poor are not inherently more unselfish than those better off, although their need for survival may necessitate better cooperation. "Romanticizing the poor is a naïve error among some who sympathize with their plight and would like to help them," (Uphoff et al., 1998). This, in turn, can underplay inequalities and power relations internal to and between CSOs, as well as national and transnational economic and political forces. Governance inside CSOs should not be assumed fair and democratic, as there are important questions as to who participates in decision-making, and how power is distributed (Edwards & Hulme, 1996b; Nyamugasira, 1998; Wellard & Copestake, 1993). For example, the tendency to treat local development as harmonious often overlooks gender, racial, or age inequalities that exclude women, minorities, and youth from resources within and outside of the CSO (Mohan & Stokke, 2000). As already noted, some CSOs are merely opportunist in their orientation, with primary accountability to profit rather than principles of development or democracy. The influx of donor funds has helped spawn a savvy, civil society elite who speak English and often have limited support in society and weak or nonexistent internal democratic mechanisms for making decisions (Johnson, 2001; Mohan & Stokke, 2000).

Democracy is a long and involved process for which there is no "quick fix", including CSOs (Ndegwa, 2001). As Friedman (1999) reminds us, "Imposing on African countries the expectation of formal democratization without either the domestic resources or the political traditions with which to sustain it was an inevitable recipe for illusion." From this perspective, identifying those CSOs that best promote democracy is an improvement over uniformly equating CSOs with democracy (Kasfir, 1998b).

8. Constraints on CSOs

8.1. Internal Challenges

While CSOs offer attractive possibilities for African development, they are not the "magic bullet", or infallible solution, for Africa's development problems (Edwards & Hulme, 1996b). Like other development actors, CSOs too face formidable external and internal challenges. CSOs do not always perform as effectively as expected in three key areas:

1. Outreach: Although CSOs potentially reach a wider cross section of the population than government or bilateral/multilateral agencies, they can nevertheless exclude certain segments. In some instances they have neglected the landless and other marginalized peoples, thereby failing to reach the poorest of the poor (Carroll, 1992; Farrington and Bebbington, 1993). Even among CSOs that successfully promote participatory practices, qualitative aspects of development such as participation are not enough if the projects fails to meet the urgent needs of the people. CSOs need to be careful of providing "patchwork" social services that serve certain regions by well-equipped CSOs while neglecting other deserving areas. Oftentimes, such shortcomings stem from CSOs' perpetual scarcity of funds and other resources. This situation is compounded by a tendency among some CSOs to follow established channels of assistance where networks already exist, in efforts to minimize costs and focus their resources where they are most likely to bring about tangible and immediate improvements; such efforts are subject to urban and language biases.

2. Scaling Up: CSOs may attempt to increase their scale and coverage of services to improve outreach and impact, or due to the donor-CSO relationship (discussed below). Diversification and increase of services is an important strategy, but it is important that CSOs do not "trip up" when they scale-up, attempting too much and sacrificing quality for quantity (Edwards & Hulme, 1992). Scaled up projects are often less effective than their smaller precursors, and involve risks of dilution and diminution of effort, but the benefits from economies of scale and increased outreach can mean greater overall improvement in serving the poor (Krishna et al., 1997). When pursued, scaling up requires restraint not to expand scope and pace too rapidly (Uphoff et al., 1998). Several of the CSOs in this Report have successfully scaled up to offer multi-sectoral approaches to development, including COWAN, NMJD, Trickle Up, and GICPAB. However, as Uphoff et al. (1998) points out, correlation does not equate with causation: "It is probably more correct to argue that successful organizations are, or become, multifunctional than to assert that multifunction organizations are, or will become, necessarily successful".

3. Accountability. Accountability refers to the means by which individuals and organizations are held responsible for their actions to others. CSOs juggle multiple accountabilities, including their donors, governmental organizations, and beneficiaries (Edwards and Hulme, 1996b). "Downward accountability" to the people or causes the CSO is meant to represent and serve is primary, while "upward accountability" to a donor, state, or other authority is secondary. Accounting for CSOs' performance is not a simple task; while profit may be used to measure the success of a business, and democratic governments are accountable in elections, NGO accountability is often more subtle. As already noted, CSOs need to be careful when advocating democracy that they "practice what they preach." This is especially true with regards to including women, youth, and minorities in initiatives. Research from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) concludes that participatory development among NGOs is not easy (Bebbington and Theile, 1993; Farrington and Bebbington, 1993; Wellard and Copestake, 1993). NGOs commonly lack systems for internal monitoring and self-evaluation to ensure that they uphold principles of democracy, as well as their stated mission, whether it is serving the poor or protecting the environment.

8.2. The Uncooperative State

A march during international flag off in Jibia Katsina State for Sub National Immunization Day (SNIDS) 2002, Nigeria. Source: JHU/CCP, Photoshare

Clearly, CSOs do not work in a political-economic vacuum, but must contend with political adversaries, foremost the state (Edwards and Hulme, 1992; Hudock, 1999). Ultimately, it is the state which remains the final arbiter and determinant of the wider political and economic climate in which CSOs pursue their mission. In many African countries, recent shifts toward political pluralism and decentralization have complicated this political climate. Structural adjustment pressures towards democratization and decentralization has fragmented special interests and often lead to polarization, violence, and political paralysis. In this context, CSOs confront vested and competing interests from government bureaucrats and politicians who may oppose attempts to transfer power and resources to the local causes CSOs support. As multilateral and bilateral corporations bypass governments, the latter have made attempts to control CSOs and their resources. In this Report, the contribution from Eurostep notes that the governments of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group have been "resistant" to the European Development Fund established by the European Commission under the Lomé Convention for the activities of non-state actors. Government officials are often suspicious of social elements beyond their patronage and control, such as CSOs that receive external sources of funding. They can refuse to recognize these CSOs, thereby excluding them from policy debates (Bratton 1989). In some cases, African governments actively attempt to restrain NGOs and nullify their impact on political reform (Fowler, 1991; Cherrett et al., 1995, Obi 1997). State hostility towards CSOs is especially pronounced when the CSOs are lobbying against the state or its position regarding an issue. As the experience of NMJD attests in its dealings with the government of Sierra Leone (Box 3), "It has been a bitter experience to learn that more often than not Governments do not respect recommendations from national consultative conferences, often resulting in catastrophic consequences".

8.3. Donor Dependency

The way in which financial resources are channeled to CSOs, and the subsequent donor-CSO relationship, is often a major constraint on CSO capacity and success in development (Edwards & Hulme, 1996ab; Hudock, 1999, 2000; Sabatini, 2002). Primary donors to CSOs include donor governments and bilateral/multilateral agencies, as well as other NGOs, especially those from the "northern" countries (NNGOs). It is important to recognize that the past decade has seen a gradual decrease in donor aid (Fowler, 2000a; Riddell, 1999). According the World Bank (2001a), official development assistance has been steadily shrinking after peaking in 1992: Sub-Saharan Africa received only 1.2% of flows to developing countries in 1998. Nevertheless, dependency on donor remains a significant limitation upon CSO autonomy and performance.

1. Autonomy. Dependency on donor funding entails substantial risk to CSO identity and autonomy. Evidence shows how the aid industry is fraught with donor self-interests and political/economic priorities that too often supercedes the development missions of CSOs, such as poverty eradication (Abubakar, 1989; Hankock, 1989; Hudock, 1999; Sabatini, 2002). As the World Bank (2001a) expresses, "Historically, aid flows have been determined more by political and strategic interests than by poverty reduction goals." When the donor-CSO relationship is "too close for comfort" the latter risks losing the autonomous, alternative, advantages for which it built its reputation as an alternative to mainstream development (Edwards & Hulme, 1996a). As already mentioned, the donor can pressure the CSO to become "service providers," filling the space created by the retrenching state, rather than social activists and agents of alternative, durable change (Manji, 2000). The erosion of autonomy can commence with the agreement to accept aid, progress with adaptation of donor criteria for programme implementation and monitoring, and include influencing appointments and the internal structures of CSOs, and introducing western languages and logical framework (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). In this process, CSOs become more attuned and accountable to the donors' needs rather than the people they are meant to represent and serve. As a result, the poor and disadvantaged can become customers rather than members; participation can be seen as instrumental rather than fundamental, and village groups can become branches rather than autonomous people's organizations. Financial dependency on donors can undermine CSO's autonomy to advocate against policies that are unpopular with governments and other donors; this, in turn, can erode CSOs' reputation for downward accountability as they are viewed as accomplices.

2. Performance. The CSO-donor relationship risks imposing imported, foreign, models on CSOs, retarding their own systems, structures, norms, and sanctions (Bebbinton & Theile, 1993; Hulme & Edwards, 1997). This is particularly true when receiving funding from government organizations or larger donor agencies with extensive bureaucratic procedures. As CSOs become more involved in large-scale service delivery and more reliant on official funding, they may erode their most valuable resources: flexibility, speed of response, and ability to innovate (Fowler 2000a). In her discussion of NGO involvement with World Bank projects, Malena (2000) identifies how the relationship can cause NGOs to over-extend their capacity, burdened with procurement of goods and services and accounting and reporting requirements that are geared towards large-scale interventions and private sector firms. The procedural responsibilities of predetermined and time-bound project cycles, (that are often slow and interrupted), can retard the efficiency and accountability for which CSOs are noted. Too often donors are unwilling to provide the long-term support and careful nurturing needed to attain the local capacity enhancement and gradual qualitative results that characterize successful institutional development. Instead, development activities are often packaged in compressed project cycles that stress immediate or short-term quantitative targets and leave little time for innovation or lessons from experiences.

9. Using (not abusing) Partnerships

March at launch of "Haki Yako" campaign - Kenya Client-Provider Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) Project), Kenya Source: JHU/CCP, Photoshare

Partnerships supporting African civil society are critical, not easy, and often abused. An "authentic" partnership is one in which there is a mutual commitment towards long-term interaction, shared responsibility and obligations, and equality and balance of power (Fowler, 1998). Such partnerships are essential for African civil society because there are limits to what CSOs can accomplish alone, whether they are grassroots organizations or international NGOs. CSOs are, by nature, peripheral to the political (state) and economic (market) systems that they are trying to change, and their initiatives are often highly localized and lacking critical political-economic leverage (Edwards and Hulme, 1992). Mutual and respectful communication, understanding, cooperation, and collaboration can help address these deficiencies. Yet caution must be exercised with the use of the term partnership. Like most development jargon, it has acquired its own mythical proportions that are too often far from the truth (Fowler, 2000a,b,c; Hudock, 2000; Malena, 2000). Partnership is an idealized notion that must be qualified with the understanding that conflict of interest is inevitable: the challenge is how to constructively resolve this conflict towards mutual understanding, trust, and benefit. Partnership is abused when it is used as a facade to disguise fundamental power differences and the poverty and injustices that accompany them (Fowler, 2000c). Civil society partners must not lose sight of the question, "Is this [partnership] really strengthening civil society, or merely an attempt to shape civil society in ways that external actors believe is desirable?" (Hulme & Edwards, 1997). Bearing this in mind, the following discussion examines CSO partnerships with international, state, and business partners, as well as partnerships between CSOs themselves.

9.1. International Partnerships

A community mapping its resources to identify problems and promote health. Kapata, Zambia Source: Elizabeth Serlemitsos, JHU/CCP

Partnerships with international actors, such as donor governments, international agencies, or international NGOs, are a valuable source of support for CSOs, especially in contexts where the state is uncooperative or lacks the resources to support domestic CSO initiatives. These partnerships have increased over the past two decades, mirroring the prominence of CSOs in development. Progress reports with the World Bank, for instance, show a steady increase in NGO cooperation over the past 25 years: NGO involvement in WB projects was 6% in 1973, 20% in 1989, 50% in 1998 (Malena, 2000). Within the Bank system, the NGO and Civil Society Unit and the Civil Society Thematic Team (CSTT) works in collaboration with regional and country offices to facilitate civil society involvement in Bank activities (World Bank 2000). Similarly, the United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service, an inter-agency programme established in 1975, offers a wide range of information and consultation services supporting NGOs, promoting civil society collaboration within the UN, and advocacy and lobbying of governments (UN/OSCAL, 1996a). In 1999, UN/OSCAL published a Directory of African NGOs listing 1,558 NGOs in one of many efforts to support African CSOs. Other UN programmes and offices support civil society in a variety of ways (Box 4).

However, as the foregoing discussion of donor-CSO relations conveys, CSO partnerships with international donors is not easy. For example, although CSO involvement in World Bank projects has increased, there is an ongoing critique that the Bank staff treat NGOs as service providers, with little collaboration, or consideration for their civic roles as defenders of affected groups or communities (Malena, 2000; Nelson, 1995). As the World Bank (2001a) expresses, "Donors have often failed to coordinate their efforts, countries have not taken ownership, and there has been heavy use of conditionally both at the project level and economy wide." A seat at the donor's table is meaningful to CSOs only if they are allowed to meaningfully participate (Hudock, 2000). The contribution from the CSO network, Eurostep, illustrates how it can be challenging for international actors to involve civil society in a consultative process, even when mechanisms are established to do so. In the Contonou Agreement between the European Union and countries of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP), Eurostep notes: "An initial analysis of the engagement of civil society organizations in this process suggests that while some consultations took place in most instances, it tended to be limited, superficial and ill prepared." Likewise, the contribution from FAS notes that women continue to be, "sidelined in their efforts to participate in the peace proces."

9.2. Government Partnerships

Computers at Myeka High School, South Africa Source: Solar Engineering Service http://www.solarengineering.co.za /gallery_myekacomputer.htm

Despite their differences and their sometimes antagonistic relationships (discussed above), the success of CSOs largely relies upon support from and cooperation with the government (Bebbington and Riddell, 1995; Johnson, 2001; Nel, 2001). The state plays an essential role in shaping the environment in which CSOs operate, including maintenance of basic rights and provision of essential services, as well as public supervision of the market. Development is, (among many things), an interdependent process between the state and civil society. While the ongoing democratization and decentralization in Africa presents certain political challenges for NGOs in their relationship to the state, it also presents new possibilities for negotiation and collaboration. In many ways these new possibilities can be advantageous for NGOs: "The development of a strong and vibrant civil society is also inextricably linked to the political opportunities the state makes available, and the ways in which poor and marginal groups in society exploit these opportunities," (Johnson, 2001). Governments can complement CSOs by providing valuable technical assistance and research that is typically beyond the reach of CSOs due to their limited budgets and lack of access to scientific and technical information. Cooperation with the government may also allow CSOs to magnify their impact on government policy, promoting more functional links to direct resources for the poor. For example, the National Solidarity Fund of Tunisia is a government programme that works with individuals and organizations from civil society to work towards poverty eradication. Governments should also uphold a fair and regulatory environment, judicial system, and advantageous tax incentives for CSOs. Finally, governments should actively include civil society in all stages of development. While NEPAD illustrates partnership between African Heads of State, as the contribution in this Report from CEPARRED points out, it was prepared without input and with little recognition of the African civil society for which it was designed to serve. As NMJD reminds us in its contribution:

Governments must learn that they will always have the support of their people if there is mutual respect and confidence. Governments that are the creation of civil society, like the one in Sierra Leone, should fear nothing but do everything with the civil society and in the interest of the people.

9.3. Business Partnerships

Mahamane Ibrahim Cisse (SOS Tabagisme Mali) at the Public Hearings in the framework of Convention on Tobacco Control, Geneva, 12-13 October 2000 Source: Pierre Virot - WHO - Geneva

CSO-business collaboration is a relatively new strategy in the development community (Ashman, 2000; Bendell, 2000; Fox, 2001; Regelbrugge, 2000a). Some notable civil society business ventures include the Business Partners in Development, a collaborative of the World Bank, global companies, and global CSOs; the Hitachi Foundation's Corporate Volunteerism Inititiative; and CIVICUS' Corporate Engagement Initiative (Regelbrugge, 2000b). Another notable initiative is the Global Compact, launched by the United Nations in 2000 to encourage companies to embrace nine universal principles in the areas of human rights, labor standards and the environment. Intersectoral collaborations between businesses and CSOs are partly the result of the rapid economic changes of the global market. For many CSOs, collaborative initiatives reflect efforts to seek alternative sources of funding and financial security (Hudock, 1999; Fowler, 2000b). With the overall reduction in available aid, such collaborations also reflect CSO efforts to seek alternative sources of funding and financial security (Hudock, 1999; Fowler, 2000b). Consequently, they are exploring "social entrepreneurship", or commercial undertakings, to cross-subsidize interventions and generate more self-financing for their mission (Fowler, 2000b).

As a development alternative, CSO-business collaboration ideally combines the complementary strengths associated with each sectoral identity: the social organizing and insights of CSOs with the productive capacity of business (Pinney, 1999; Twose & Blakeley, 1999). The business partner brings to the partnership experience in management and growth strategies that stress efficiency, informed from a profit-focused perspective, while the CSO typically offers expertise and relations with communities and vulnerable groups, informed from a development perspective. Together, the partnership has high potential, but in practice it is a challenging line to walk between the private, for-profit sector and the civic, socially responsible sector. Inherent costs for the CSO include significant investments in time and effort to adopt organizational and management skills and business language (Ashman, 2000). In the process of adapting to the business culture, CSOs risk their own civic culture and autonomy, and thus accountability to their beneficiaries. With social entrepreneurship, CSOs are less sensitive to loss in public trust, but more vulnerable to shifts in market conditions (Fowler, 2000b). Similar to the aforementioned CSO-donor roles, in the CSO-business partnership, the CSO risks becoming "resource dependent," while the business easily becomes "resource dominant".

9.4. CSO Inter-Partnerships

A workshop held in Kampala, Uganda, 18-20 january, 1999 Source: www.iia.msu.edu

In a discussion of CSO partnerships, it is important to include the need to promote, maintain, and improve partnerships between CSOs themselves. As already noted, the CSO community is not some amorphous, harmonious family. Instead, CSOs are susceptible to the same political-economic challenges that characterize development itself. There are real conflicts between groups in civil society. With aid becoming more scarce in the development industry, competition and opportunism between CSOs is becoming more commonplace (Edwards, 1999; Wallace, 2002). This trend, compounded by globalization and its increasing inequalities for Africa, only underscores the imperative for cooperation and partnerships within African civil society.

Several of the contributions in this Report illustrate these benefits of CSO inter-partnerships, most notably those between PAC, NMJD, and other CSOs in conflict resolution Sierra Leone (Box 3); the World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA) and the Conference of NGOs in Consultative Relationships with the United Nations (CONGO) in their respective efforts to facilitate greater civil society participation in the UN system (Box 4); FAS and its partner CSOs, and Eurostep. The latter is a network of nineteen NGOs from 14 European countries coordinating development policy objectives toward the European Union, including civil society participation in the Contonou Process from African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP) countries. Eurostep highlights how northern CSOs can contribute to African development, embodying the principles of mutual cooperation among CSOs in an interconnected "global village."

However, it is important to note, as Eurostep does, that inter-partnerships among African CSOs is not easy: "In some ways civil society organizations within the Caribbean and Pacific regions found it easier to develop regional cohesion than the region of Africa. The size of the African continent, with its regional and linguistic differences, has hampered the development of collective agendas." One promising strategy to address such challenges of distance between African CSOs is the application of information and communication technologies (ICTs). This was highlighted by the African Development Forum (ADF), an initiative led by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA) to reinforce development among African partners. Its 1999 Recommendations for Effective Participation of Civil Society in the Information Age stressed, among other recommendations, "[African] NGOs and CBOs [community based organizations] must develop expertise and enhance knowledge on how new ICTs, and the policies that are made in regards to those ICTs, affect them".

10. Summary & Lessons

As the first lesson below reminds us, generalizations about something as diverse as African civil society is risky. Thus, the following lessons are far from conclusive, but rather serve as a brief summary, building on the proceeding discussion and recommendations from the vast literature on civil society organizations (i.e. Fowler, 2000c; Hudock, 1999; Krishna et al. 1998; Malena, 2000; Pettit, 2000; Uphoff et al., 1998). Owing to the multiplicity of development actors involved with African civil society, the following lessons are pertinent not only for African civil society itself, but also actors within the larger development context that can foster a supportive, enabling environment towards African civil society.

1. Do not generalize about African civil society. African civil society is not some amorphous, harmonious family, but rather a complex and diverse phenomenon. It is essential not to romanticize or over-estimate Africa's civil society, but to recognize the distinctly political and economic realities that shape African civil society and adopt development strategies accordingly.

2. Civil society organizations (CSOs) have a potential far greater than mere "service providers." . CSO activity should not be confined to filling the space of the retreating state, or to the agendas of more powerful development actors which CSOs depend upon for funding. In areas such as capacity building and advocacy, CSOs have proven to be agents of alternative, durable change.

3. CSOs can assist Africa with accelerating globalization and the technological revolution. CSOs have and must continue to advocate for more equitable policies towards globalization and information and communication technologies (ICT), addressing the growing inequalities associated with each in Africa.

4. Network and collaborate among CSOs. Networking not only reduces the likelihood of competition and service duplication, but also allows CSO to share and conserve limited resources. Collaboration enhances CSO morale, commitment, and identity, and strengthens collective effort to better exert pressure for advocacy.

5. Remain flexible and innovative. Donors and governments should avoid "blueprint" models for project planning and management that straightjacket CSOs' ability to experiment, modify, and better adapt to and serve specific localities. Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, predetermined and time-bound project cycles, and quantitative short-term targets rather than qualitative long-term investments sacrifice the very comparative advantages CSOs offer the development community.

6. Practice (don't just preach) participatory principles. CSOs are not automatically democratic and participatory, but must actively strive to include all people in programme planning and implementation, regardless of gender, race, nationality, religion, age, or income. CSOs and other development partners should stress a process-oriented approach to development in which sectoral priorities, timelines and outcomes, and monitoring and evaluation unfold in consultation with the community (Pettit, 2000). It is especially important to integrate women and youth into this process, as they are an integral part of and key contributors to development.

7. Strengthen programme assessment, monitoring, and evaluation at all levels. This allows partners to better shape expectations and working relationships with CSOs, and CSOs to better understand their partners, as well as their own capabilities, and plan accordingly. It also informs appropriate assistance to CSOs, including training, technical assistance, diplomatic intervention, as well as meaningful inclusion in the programme design, implementation, and monitoring. Recognizing the CSO's "lifecycle" in its organizational maturity can ensure that pressure is not exerted to scale up too quickly, or to avoid pre-mature withdrawal of support (Hudock, 1999; Uphoff et al., 1998).

8. Prioritize CSO autonomy and accountability. Given the tendency for many CSOs and their development approaches to be eclipsed or co-opted by the agenda of its donors, business partners, or governments, special emphasis must be placed on maintaining autonomy and accountability. Towards this end, CSOs must articulate a clear mission, and develop practical and credible mechanisms that will enable them to be accountable to their many constituents. It is important, however, that these mechanisms do not impair effectiveness with excessive bureaucracy, but allow CSOs to maintain their integrity and downward accountability to their beneficiaries.

9. Explore alternative sources for CSO financial sustainability rather than reliance on donors . With the decline in development aid from the international community, CSOs should explore alternative financing strategies, such as public relations and fund raising, philanthropic contributions, engaging the corporate sector, and business ventures (Fowler, 2000b; Hudock, 1999; Regelbrugge, 2000a). Such strategies should be pursued as a means to complement and expand CSO growth and mission without sacrificing autonomy and accountability.

10. Enhance dialogue among all development actors. Dialogue between CSOs and African governments can defuse tension, reduce many of the political obstacles for CSOs, and inform national policy-makers of existing social structures to better design policies for local realities. To this end, mechanisms for dialogue, such as policy consultations, conferences, mutual evaluations, and forums should be created, preferably at the country level. Dialogue between all actors improves knowledge sharing, which broadens dissemination of successful strategies, as well as lessons from problems, creating a multiplier effect that improves outreach and impact. It also allows development partners to identify common interests from which to build a unified agenda and solidarity.

11. Governments-CSO partnerships are essential. The government can create a democratic and legal framework that supports African civil society by upholding a fair and regulatory environment, judicial system, and advantageous tax incentives for CSOs. Governments can also complement and support CSOs by providing valuable technical assistance and research that is typically beyond the reach of CSOs. Finally, governments should actively include civil society in all stages of development planning and evaluation to better understand and shape policy according to local realities.

12. Use rather than abuse "partnerships". Partnerships are critical for African civil society because there are limits to what CSOs can accomplish alone, whether they are international NGOs or grassroots organizations. However, the pretence of partnership is often used as a facade to disguise political and economic realities in a relationship, serving the agenda of the more powerful partner, while limiting CSO autonomy and accountability. A true partnership should apply the principle of interdependence, stressing long-term interaction, mutual commitments, shared responsibilities (participatory principles), and an equal balance of power. Towards this end, CSOs should clearly articulate and adhere to their missions, and be prepared to negotiate them well, knowing the expectations, goals, and capabilities of involved partners.

The mission di OSCAL is to mobilize international support for the development of Africa and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), with the ultimate goal of ensuring their integration into the global community as equal partners. Through the coordination of inputs from UN and other bodies, OSCAL facilitates inter-governmental debates and negotiations on Africa and LDCs. In its advocacy role, it analyzes various issues and trends relating to African development and promotes dialogue involving African countries and LDCs, with their development partners.